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Executive Summary
The effect of competitionon innovation incentives has been a controversial
subject in economics since Joseph Schumpeteradvanced the theory that com-
petitive markets are not necessarily the most effectiveorganizations to promote
innovation. The incentive to innovate is the differencein profit that a firm can
earn if it invests in research and development comparedto what it would earn
if it did not invest. The concept isstraightforward, yet differences in market
structure, the characteristics of innovations, andthe dynamics of discovery
lead to seemingly endless variations in thetheoretical relationship between
competition and expenditures on research and developmentor the outputs of
research and development (R&D). Thispaper surveys the economic theory of
innovation, focusing on market structure and itsrelationship to competition,
the distinction between product andprocess innovations, and the role of exclu-
sive and nonexclusive rights to innovation, anddraws conclusions from the
different models. Exclusive rights generally leadto greater innovation incen-
tives in more competitive markets, whilenonexclusive rights generally lead to
the opposite conclusion, although thereare important exceptions. The paper
reviews the large literature on empirical studies ofinnovation and finds some
support for the predictions of the theory.
I.Introduction
There is broad agreementamong economists that research and devel-
opment is a major source of economic growth. Althoughestimates dif-
fer, most studies show a high correlationbetween R&D expenditures
and productivity growth after accountingfor investmentin ordinary
capital. Studies also show that the socialreturn to investment in R&D
is higher than the private return (Griiches1992), which suggests that
policies that promote innovationcan pay large dividends for society
One way to achieve these benefits isto promote industry structures that160
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offer greater incentives for innovation,including policies toward merg-
ers and laws that governexclusionary conduct.
The objective of this paper is toreview the theory and empirical
evidence on the relationship betweencompetition, market structure,
and R&D. The debate of course tracesback to arguments advanced by
Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1942) thatlarge firms provide a more stable
platform to invest in research anddevelopment and that perfect com-
petition is not necessarily the mostefficient market structure to pro-
mote R&D. The validity of theSchumpeterian view that large firmsand
concentrated market structures promoteinnovation is the subject of a
voluminous theoretical and empiricalliterature, and the results often
appear contradictory. Myobjective is to discern general patterns inthis
sea of information, atask that sometimes seems akin tounraveling the
genetic code.
My focus is on the effects ofcompetition on R&D investment and
outcomes for product and processinnovations under conditions of
exclusive and nonexclusiveintellectual property rights. Despite the
length of this survey it neglects manyimportant aspects of competi-
tion and innovation. It does notinvestigate the extent to which pri-
vate incentives for R&Ddepart from socially optimal levels.Although
the survey compares theoreticalpredictions for industries with exclu-
sive and nonexclusive protectionfor innovation, it does not deal with
information spillovers that reducethe cost of imitation. I also do not
explore in this survey innovation incentivescreated by vertical market
structures, which may affect theflow of information from consumers to
producers at different levels in a supplychain, nor do I deal with topics
such as the design of intellectual propertyrights, technology adoption,
diffusion, network effects and compatibility.While these other market
characteristics can have profound implicationsfor investments in R&D,
the limited focus on competitionprovides enough complexity for our
task.
A motivation for this reviewof the theory and evidence on the link
between competition and innovationis the possibility that publicpol-
icy interventions, such as antitrustand deregulation, may shape the
forces for technological progress bymaking discrete changes in market
conditions. Between 2000 and 2003the U.S. Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commissionchallenged a total of 109 mergers and
mentioned innovation effects as a reason tochallenge the merger in 41
cases, or in more than oneout of every three mergerchallenges.' These
numbers understate the extent to whichthe U.S. antitrust agencies haveWhere Are We in the Cornpetitjon.-JnnovationDebate? 161
raised innovationconcerns in merger challenges, becausemany of the
mergers that did not raise innovationconcerns were in industries that
performed little or no research anddevelopment. The actions of the
U.S. antitrust enforcement agenciesreflect a judgment thatcompetition
is a spur for innovation.
The scope for policies suchas challenges to mergers is, however, lim-
ited because market structure andinnovation are simultaneously deter-
mined. Sutton (1998) derivesa lower bound on industryconcentration
under the assumption that thereis free entry into an industry,entry
incurs sunk costs, and all actualentrants earn non-negative profits. For
example, if sunk costs arevery large, profits must be similarly largeto
allow for non-negative profits, andtherefore marketconcentration must
be high enough to support theseprofits, which in turn dependson the
competitive forces that operate in the industry.Sutton's lower bound
approach reminds us of the importanceof the simultaneous determi-
nation of market structure and R&D.It does not strip the inquiry of
all relevance because the minimumlevel of concentration tosustain
entry could be quite low and marketequilibria could exist withmore
concentrated markets. For example,we can ask whether the merger of
two firms would increaseor decrease incentives for innovation without
violating Sutton's conditionon the lower bound of market concentra-
tion, even if over the longrun new entry may return the industryto a
less concentrated level.
Section II surveys the theoreticalliterature on competition and R&D.
This section highlights how theoreticalpredictions about the relation-
ship between competition andinnovation depend on issues suchas
whether intellectual property rightsprovide exclusive protection for
innovators and whether the innovationcreates a new product or low-
ers the cost of an existing product. Section IIIreviews empirical studies
relating firm size and competitionto R&D in light of the predictions
from the different models. Theempirical studies rarely account for
the many factors that the theorysuggests should be significant deter-
minants of innovative activity. Ourgoal is to draw conclusions from
these studies to providea better foundation for future empirical work
on the market determinants of innovation. Wefind some support in
the empirical literature for thetheory, which makes predictions about
the link between competitionand innovation that are highly specificto
characteristics of innovations and themechanisms to protect the value
created by the new technologies. Asa general conclusion, there is mod-
est support for the proposition thatprocess innovations, which tend toGilbert
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be used internally, are moreprofitable for large businesses, becausethe
benefits of process innovations areproportional to the level of produc-
tion to which the innovationsapply. For product innovations,there is
little evidence to supportthe Schumpeterian viewthat monopoly or
highly concentrated market structurespromote innovation, and some
evidence supporting the conclusionthat innovation thrives in more
competitive markets.
II.Economic Theory of Competitionand Innovation
As a general statement,the incentive to innovate isthe difference in
profit that a firm can earnif it invests in R&D compared towhat it
would earn if it did not invest.These incentives depend upon many
factors including: thecharacteristics of the invention,the strength of
intellectual property protection,the extent of competition beforeand
after innovation, barriers to entryin production and R&D,and the
dynamics of R&D. Economictheory does not offer a predictionabout
the effects of competition oninnovation that is robust toall of these
different market and technologicalconditions. Instead, there are many
predictions and one reason whyempirical studies have notgenerated
clear conclusions aboutthe relationship between competitionand inno-
vation is a failure of many ofthese studies to account fordifferent mar-
ket and technological conditions.
The strength of intellectualproperty protection is animportant deter-
minant of the profit frominvention because it determinesthe extent to
which the inventor can exploitthe potential of her discovery toadd
value. Suppose the invention is a newprocess that allows amanufac-
turer to lower itsmarginal production cost. Thevalue of the new pro-
cess is the increase inprofit from using the newtechnology. For a small
reduction in marginal cost,this is the amount of the costreduction
times the output for whichthe cost reduction applies. Thevalue calcu-
lation is somewhat morecomplicated if the inventionenables a large
cost reduction, becausethe invention may allow the firm toexpand its
output after it adopts the newtechnology
The inventor can reach alarger output if she can licensethe tech-
nology for use by others Ifthe inventor can sell or licensethe new
technology to others, the totalvalue that the inventor maycollect is the
sum of the costreductions for all the potentialadopters. If the inven-
tor can't sell or license toothers, the inventor derives nobenefit from
the new technology unlessshe can employ the newtechnology in herWhere Are We in the Competition-InnovationDebate? 163
own operations, and in that case the value wouldbe limited to the cost
reduction for. her own output. However,licensing is profitable for the
inventor only if she can preventwidespread imitation withoutappro-
priate compensation.
Whether the inventorcan sell or license her new technology isusu-
ally, though not necessarily, determinedby whether the invention is
protected by an exclusive intellectualproperty right, such as a patent. A
patent confers the right to exclude others frommaking, using, or selling
the invention claimed by thepatent for the term of the patent grant. If the
new technology is patented, the inventorcan assign the patent to another
firm or license one ormore firms to use the new technology, perhaps in
different territories or to manufacturedifferent products. In thisway, the
patent allows the inventor to expand theuniverse of potential applica-
tions for the new technology and increaseits value.
Patent protection does notguarantee that the inventor wifi be able
to prevent competition from others, eitherlegally by inventing-aroimd
the new technology, or ifiegally byinfringing the patent. Several stidies
have shown that patents donot confer substantial protection inmany
industries (see, e.g., Levin et al. (1985),Cohen et al. (1989) and Hall
and Ziedonis (2001)). If patentprotection is weak or nonexistent, the
inventor may choose to keep thenew technology a secret, avoiding
disclosure and thereby hopingto gain an advantage before otherscan
imitate her discovery. Insome cases a new discovery may require large
complementary investments that raise barriersto entry for imitators
and give the inventor at leastsome exclusivity. Licensing is not out of
the question even if the discovery doesnot have the protection ofa pat-
ent. Sometimes the information requiredto employ a new technology
is so specialized that it requiresextensive teaching from the inventor
or another experienced user. Thiscan be accomplished with a know-
how license. The risk to the inventorof a know-how.license is that the
licensee may renege on promisedroyalty payments after the licensee
obtains the information requiredto use the new technology.2 However
Anton and Yao (1994) show that in theabsence of patent protection
an inventor may be able to discourage thistype of misappropriation
by threatening to license theknow-how to rival firms if the licensee
reneges on the terms of the agreement.
The choice to licensea new discovery to others or. to restrict itsuse to
the inventor's own operations dependson the nature of patent protec-
tion and on the practicality of othermeans that may be available to the
inventor to protect against unwanted imitators.These conditions in turn164
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greatly affect the value that the inventor canextract from the new tech-
nology and the likely impacts ofpotential competitors on that value. Sup-
pose that an inventorcannot obtain or design anexclusive right to a new
technology because patent protectionis not available or is not effective.
In this case, anyone canindependently discover and use the newtechnol-
ogy: The first person toinvent benefits more than otherswho introduce
the new technology: to the extentthat secrecy can give her ahead start
against her rivals, or if she is sodominant in the industry that she can
ignore competition from rivals.
In the case of nonexciusiveintellectual property rights the presence
of rival firms that canindependently invent and adopt the new pro-
cess technology reducesthe value of discovery to eachpotential inven-
tot As the number of firmsthat compete in research anddevelopment
increases it is likely, though not necessary:that each firm's share of the
total output using the new technologywould fall and so would its cor-
responding benefit from invention.3 Inthis case, competition in R&D and
in the market for the newtechnology reduces the value of innovation.
With nonexciusive rights to a processtechnology and profit-maximizing
inventors, competition can bebad for R&D.4 This result is consistentwith
the Schumpeterian view thatlarge firms and firms in concentratedindus-
tries have greater incentives to engagein R&D because they arebetter
able to capture its benefits.
The strength of intellectual propertyprotection affects incentives to
invest in product innovations aswell as process innovations. The analy-
sis of these incentives is morecomplex for product innovations because
a firm's profitsbefore and after innovation depend onthe mix of other
products in its portfolio. Nonetheless, wedraw some conclusions below
about the profit incentives forproduct innovations that apply tocertain
types of innovations. Thedynamics of the innovation processalso affect
incentives to invest in R&D. A firm maybe able to pre-empt competi-
tors in R&D if a head startin the innovation process givesthe firm a dis-
crete advantage in securing anexclusive right to the innovation. Ifthat is
not the case, firms cansimultaneously engage in R&D, eachwith a rea-
sonable expectation that its R&Dexpenditures will generate a significant
return.
The many different predictionsof theoretical models of R&Dlead
some to concludethat there is no coherent theoryof the relationship
between market structure and investmentin innovation. That is not
quite correct. The models haveclear predictions, although theydif-
fer in important ways that canbe related to market andtechnologicalWhere Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate? 165
characteristics. It is not that we don't havea model of market structure
and R&D, but rather that we havemany models and it is important to
know which model is appropriate for each marketcontext.
Incentives to Innovate with Exclusive Propertij Rights
The incentive to innovate clearly dependson the nature of rights to
successful innovation. If an innovator cannot excludeimitators or pre-
vent independent discovery of similar ideas, this reduces thebenefit
from innovating, holding constantany spillover effects from others'
innovation efforts. Here we assume thata successful inventor gains
perfect and perpetual protection for her discovery. Thisis of course an
extreme assumption and unrealistic for most market situations. Patents,
for example, do not confer substantial protectionin many industries,
although protection can come from othermeans, such as secrecy and
complementary investments that deter imitators.5
Competition and Monopoly with Exclusive Protectionfor Innovation.
Under the assumption that an innovator enjoysperfect and perpetual
exclusive property rights to its invention, Arrow (1962)shows that a
pure monopoly that is unexposed to competition for existing andnew
technologies has less incentive to invest in R&D fora process invention
than does a firm in a competitive industry. A firm thathas a monopoly
position in a market has a flow of profit that it enjoys ifno innovation
takes place. The monopolist can increase its profit byinnovating, but it
loses the profits from its old technology. Onnet the monopolist gains
only the increment to its profits. Tirole (1997) calls thisreduction in
incentives due to the loss of existing profits the "replacementeffect." A
firm in a competitive industry hasno legacy flow of profits to lose other
than the normal profits fora competitive industry. If the competitive
firm can capture the same benefit from innovationas the monopolist,
its differential return is higher. Hence Arrow concludesthat with exclu-
sive intellectual property rightsa firm in a competitive industry has a
greater incentive to invest in R&D than doesa monopolist.
Arrow's model has a number of important explicitand implicit
assumptions. His analysis is for a process innovation thatlowers a
firm's constant marginal production cost fromsome c0 to c1 <c0. The
monopolist's incentive to invent is the profit itcan earn using the new
process (with resulting marginal cost c1) less the profit itcan earn using
the old process (with marginal cost c0). Arrowcompares this incentiveto the incentive to invent for a firmin a competitive industry. The com-
petitive firms supply the same homogenousproduct as the monopolist.
Prior to invention, each competitor has a constantmarginal cost c0 and
earns a profit thatdepends on the degree of competition among the
firms in the industry. Competitive firms earn noprofit using the old
technology if they have constant and equalmarginal costs and behave
as price-taking perfectcompetitors. In any case, the natural forcesof
competition would cause a competitive firm usingthe old technology
to earn less thin a monopolistwith the old technology. Arrow assumes
that there is only a single successful inventor,which would be the case
if the invention has perfect patent protection.The inventor's only actual
or potential competition comesfrom the former monopolist and her
profit depends on the relative costs c1 and c0. If c issufficiently smaller
than c0, the inventor's monopoly price is lessthan the former monop-
olist's marginal cost. Arrow calls this a drasticinnovation. The former
monopolist has no effect on the profit that the inventor can earnusing
the new process technology when the inventionis drastic.
For a drastic innovation, the inventor'sprofit is the monopoly profit
with the new technology, because the oldtechnology is obsolete. This
holds whether the inventor is the monopolist or acompetitive firm,
provided that the inventor has a perpetual right tothe new process that
excludes imitators. Consequently, for a drasticinvention, the (gross)
payoff from invention is the same for themonopolist or a competitive
firm, but the replacement effect is largerfor the monopolist. The incen-
tive to invent is the difference betweenthe payoff from invention and
the profits that are replaced by the invention.For a drastic innovation,
this net payoff from invention is larger for acompetitive firm than for
the monopolist.6
A comparison of invention incentives is morecomplex if the process
innovation is not drastic. For a nondrasticinnovation, a competitive
inventor's profit is limited by competition with theformer monopo-
list's old technology. That is, the monopoly pricecorresponding to mar-
ginal cost c1 exceeds c0. Competition from the oldtechnology implies
that a competitive firm earns less with the new processthan a pure
monopolist would earn; the gross payoff fromthe invention is smaller
for a competitive firm. However, Arrow showsthat after deducting the
monopolist's profit using the old technology, the netpayoff from inno-
vation is lower for the monopolist evenif the process innovation is not
drastic, provided that a competitor would earn noprofit using the old
process technology.7
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Arrow's conclusions do not apply directly to productinnovations,
which are significant both because theyaccount for a large fraction of
total R&D expenditures and because they includemany of the break-
throughs that spur economic growth and advanceconsumer welfare.8
The analysis of innovation incentives ismore complicated for product
innovations for at least two reasons. First,even firms that act as competi-
tive price-takers can earn positive profits when theyoffer differentiated
products. This means that a competitive firm also facesa replacement
effect from the profit that it couldearn using the pre-innovation prod-
ucts. Second, a new product changes the ability ofa monopolist to dis-
criminate among consumers. Fora process innovation, a reasonable
assumption is that the new technology dominates theold technology
and hence the old process technology is irrelevantto the profit that the
monopolist can earn with the newprocess. This is not necessarily a
good assumption for product innovations. Anew product can allow
a firm with a portfolio that includes the old product to differentiateits
offerings and extract more surplus fromconsumers than would be pos-
sible using only the new product.9
As in the case of a process innovation,a monopolist's incentive to
invest in R&D for a new product is the difference in themonopoly prof-
its with and without the new product. Assumingaway differences in
managerial efficiency, competitionensures that a competitor's profit
using the old product is no greater thana monopolist's profit using
only the old product. Hence the replacementeffect should be less for
a competitive firm, although it is not likely to bezero when firms sell
differentiated products. This implies thata competitor has a greater net
incentive to invest in product innovation. However,the replacement
effect is only half of the equation. A monopolistmay be able earn more
with the new product than a competitor couldearn when it sells the
new product in competition with the former monopolist. Wecannot
make a general conclusion that for productinnovations a monopolist
has a lower incentive to invent.
Greenstein and Ramey (1998) show thata monopolist can benefit
more from a product innovation than a competitor. In their model all
consumers prefer the new product to the old product. If the monopolist
innovates, it can use the old and thenew products to separate consum-
ers according to their willingness to pay, and therebyearn more profit.
They show that for a class of distributions ofconsumer preferences the
benefit to the monopolist from introducing thenew product exceeds the
profit that a new competitor canearn by selling only the new product.The appendix provides another exampleof product innovation incen-
tives. Firms are spatially differentiated;with equal prices, a consumer
prefers the product sold by the firm thatis closest to her location. If
the spatial differentiation is not too large,the incentive for a monopoly
incumbent firm to invest in a new productexceeds the incentive for a
new competitor. In thisexample the competitor can earn a profit bysell-
ing only the old product becausethe products are differentiated. The
competitor faces a replacement effect thatdulls its incentive to inno-
vate. The monopolist also has areplacement effect, but under some
conditions the monopolist can earn moreby selling both the new and
the old product than a competitor can earnwith only the new product.
A clear ordering of incentives forproduct innovation in monopoly
and competitive markets is difficult toobtain even if the innovation
is drastic. A product innovation isdrastic if the competitor's profit is
the same as if it were a monopolist with(only) the new product. Even
if the innovation is drastic, this does notexclude the possibility that a
monopolist could use both products to increase itsprofits by differen-
tiating its offerings. We can concludethat incentives to invest in a new
product are lower for the monopolist if weimpose a stronger condi-
tion on the characteristics of the newproduct. A competitor will have
a greater incentive to innovateif the new product makes the old prod-
uct obsolete. This condition is strongerthan the definition of a drastic
invention, in the sense that any innovationthat makes the old product
obsolete is also drastic, but the oppositeneed not be the case. If the
new product makes theold product obsolete for the monopolist aswell
as a new competitor,the competitor's gross benefit from innovationis
no less than the monopolist'sand it faces a smaller replacement effect.
Hence the competitor's net benefit is larger.
Summarizing, we can generally concludethat competition is more
likely to provide greater incentives forproduct innovations (as well as
process innovations) if the followingconditions apply:
Competition in the old product is intense. This lowersthe pre-innovation
rofit for a competitor and increases its incentive toinvent.
The innovation makes the old technology obsolete.Under this assump-
tion, the monopolist's gain from innovationdoes not exceed the gain to
a new competitor.
Pre-emptive Investment in R&D. JosephSchumpeter's concept of
"creative destruction" assumes that monopolies aretemporary and give
168 GilbertWhere Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate? 169
way to new competition that is the result of innovation. Yet Arrow's
model makes the strong assumption that the monopolist is entirely
shielded from competition, even for the new product. How would
innovation incentives change if we allow for competition to inventnew
products or processes? Gilbert and Newbery (1982) considera simple
model in which a monopolist in an existing technology anda new com-
petitor invest in R&D to patent a new technology. Their modelassumes
that the firm that invests the most wins the patent with certainty. The
patent provides perfect and perpetual exclusion from competition in
the new technology. Because the firm that invests the most wins thepat-
ent with certainty, the model is similar to an auction market in which
the firm that bids the most wins the prize.
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) show that undersome circumstances a
monopolist has agreaterincentive than a competitive firm to bid for the
patent if the invention is nondrastic. If a competitor wins the patent, and
the invention is not drastic, it competes with the former monopolist. If
the competitor loses the bid for the patent, its profit is limited by the
amount it can earn by competing with the old techno1ogy whichmay
be zero. The most that a competitor would bid for thepatent is the dif-
ference between its profit with the new technology and its profit with-
out it. If the monopolist wins the patent, it remains a monopolist and
earns a corresponding monopoly profit. If it loses the bidding contest,
it becomes a duopolist with the old technology andearns a duopoly
profit. The monopolist's incentive to invent is the difference between
the two. Under the usual assumptions, the monopolist hasmore to
gain from winning the patent than a competitor. The monopolistgets
to keep its monopoly profit if it wins, and becomes just anothercom-
petitor if it loses. The monopolist's incentive to bidmore for the patent
than the rival can afford is the stream of monopoly profits itcan retain
by preempting competition. For a process innovation, the monopolist
earns strictly more by preempting a rival if the innovation is not dras-
tic, because in this case the entry of a competitor would erode the total
profit that is available in the market. The difference between monopoly
profits and total industry profits with the entry ofa new firm is what
Tirole (1997) calls the "efficiency effect." If the innovation is drastic,
the new competitor can earn as much as the monopolist with thenew
technology and therefore has as much incentive as the monopolistto
bid for the patent.
The Gilbert and Newbery model suggests thata monopolist has an
incentive to preempt R&D competition by biddingmore for a patent170 Gilbert
than a competitor can afford to invest. By doing so, themonopolist pro-
tects its monopoly profit, and this is worth morethan the competitor
can earn if it wins the bid but has tocompete with the former monop-
olist. Preemption would allow the monopoly to persist inthe face of
R&D competition, however the preemption result rests onseveral key
assumptions. These include: the firm that bids the mostfor the pat-
ent wins it with a high degree of certainty;the patent provides perfect
protection from competition other than from theformer monopolist
using the old technology; there are no entry pathsother than the pat-
ented technology; an entrant that wins a patent cannot bargainwith the
incumbent for exclusive rights to the new technology (seeSalant 1984);
and the monopolist faces no competition in the oldtechnology.
To illustrate the importance of the assumption thatthe incumbent is
a monopolist, supposeinstead that there are a large number of identi-
cal incumbent firms and the innovation is a new processthat allows
production with a small improvement in the firm's marginal cost.If an
incumbent firm succeeds in patenting the new process, thenumber of
firms that operate in the industry is unchanged and itsprofit increases
slightly because it has a slightly lower marginal cost. If a newcompeti-
tor succeeds in winning the patent, it would earnalmost as much as a
successful incumbent. Vickers (1985) shows that a new competitorhas
a greater incentive to bid for a processpatent than an incumbent in a
Cournot-Nash oligopoly if the difference in marginal production cost
from the new technology is sufficiently small.
In the examples discussed so far the market participantshave the
same cost structures before innovation occurs.Suppose firms initially
have different marginal costs. Does the opportunity toinnovate allow
weak firms to catch up or surpass their more efficientrivals, or does
innovation encourage the more efficient firms to increasethe gap over
their less efficient rivals? Boone (2000a) explores these incentivesand
shows that the incentives depend on the degree of competition among
the firms. If firms compete aggressively, he shows that the mostefficient
firm has the highest value for a new process technologyand would bid
the most for it by investing in R&D. If competition isweak, the least
efficient firm has the highest value for the new processtechnology.'0
Thus, Boone shows that R&D to develop new process technologieswill
tend to sustain the position of dominant firms in industriescharacter-
ized by aggressive competition, while R&D will allowlagging firms
to catch up to or leapfrog their competitors inindustries characterized
by weak competition. The degree of competitionitself is likely to beWhere Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate? 171
endogenous. Firms are likely to compete aggressively if their costs and
product qualities are not too dissimilar. Hence R&D that changescosts
and qualities will change incentives for competition, which inturn
changes incentives for firms to maintain a dominant positionor to leap-
frog a strong competitor.
R&D Uncertainty and Dynamics. The Gilbert-Newbery preemption
result implicitly assumes that firms bid fora patent and the patent is
awarded to the highest bidder. Reinganum (1983) makes themore real-
istic assumption that invention is uncertain; investment increases the
probability that a firm will win the patent, but does not guaranteesuc-
cess. Her model assumes that discovery follows an exponential process:
the probability that a discovery will occur before date t is F(t)1 - et.
The parameter h is called the hazard rate, or more appropriate for this
context, the success rate. It is the probability per unit time thata firm
will make the discovery at time t conditional onno discovery before t.
If the success rate is constant or a constant function of R&D investment,
and if the payoffs to innovating are also constant (or appreciateat an
exponential rate), then a firm's optimal investment in R&D is indepen-
dent of time, conditional on no firm makinga discovery.
Reinganum (1983) shows that the monopoly preemption resultin
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) disappears when R&D followsa discovery
process that is exponentially distributed and the innovation is drastic,
for reasons that can be traced directly to Arrow's replacement effect. If
the risk is low that a competitor will innovate,a monopolist has a low
incentive to invest in R&D because it benefits only from the incremen-
tal value of the invention relative to its old technology. If the competi-
tor 's R&D is likely to succeed, and if the invention is drastic, then the
monopolist has the same incentive to invent as the inventor. In expected
terms, it is profitable for the monopolist to invest less thana competitor
when the invention is drastic. By extension, Reinganumargues that the
monopolist has a smaller incentive to invest in R&D thana competitor
even for some nondrastic innovations.
Reinganum (1985) extends the model to allow formany competitors
and a sequence of innovations. Each innovation in thesequence is more
valuable than its predecessor. A discovery generatesa profit flow for
the innovator and nothing for all other firms; that is, each discovery is
a drastic innovation. The implications of this somewhat more general
model parallel the results in the model with only two firms anda single
innovation. A successful innovator is analogous to the incumbent in the172 Gilbert
duopoly model. The challengers are all the firms that did not discover
the latest generation of the technology The incumbent investsless than
a challenger, as in the duopolymodel, and all challengers invest at the
same rate.11
These results are insightful, but it does not follow that anincumbent
firm has a lower incentive to invest in R&D for allnondrastic innova-
tions, even when the probability of discovery isexponential. Indeed the
monopoly preemption result in Gilbert and Newbery (1982) can rear its
head if the old technology is a sufficiently close substitute forthe new
technology. Closed form solutions are difficult to obtain,but it is not
difficult to generate plausible numerical examples fornondrastic inno-
vations in which the incumbent monopolist invests at morethan twice
the rate of a potential entrant.
We return to this dynamic theory of R&D later inthe discussion of
empirical studies of R&D competition. As a theoretical matter, we note
here that Arrow's result that incumbent monopolieshave less to gain
from innovation than competitors applies to dynamicmodels of R&D
when the probability of discovery is exponentiallydistributed and the
invention is drastic. That result can change if oldtechnologies are close
substitutes for new discoveries. Furthermore, the resultsthat follow
from a model of R&D competition when the probabilityof discovery
has an exponential distribution do not generalize to otherplausible
R&D technologies.
Beyond Exponential Discovery: Preemption and Leapfrog R&D.The
exponential discovery model in Reinganum (1983) is "memory-less."
Each firm's probability of discovery is a functiononly of its current
investment in R&D.12 A firm's history of R&D expendituresdoes not
influence its current or future success probabilities, and thereis no
sense in which past expenditures can give afirm a lead in the R&D
competition. Until a firm makes a discovery, the R&D competition at
each point in time looks the same and therefore optimalR&D expen-
ditures do not change. The exponential model is convenientand may
be a reasonable approximation of R&D competition in someindustries.
In other circumstances one might expect that pastR&D expenditures
would affect current success probabilities and that each firm'soptimal
investment in R&D would depend on the progress thatother firms
have made toward discovery.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that for a given expenditure onR&D
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time if it has more R&D experience. Experience could be directlypro-
portional to cumulative R&D expenditures or could increase instages.
For example, early stages could correspond to intermediate discoveries
or to a period of basic research, while later stages could correspond to
more focused development expenditures. Fudenberg et al. (1983) and
Harris and Vickers (1985a) describe patent races with the property that
discovery occurs with certainty when, and only when,a firm's cumu-
lative R&D exceeds some threshold. In these models, firmscompete
aggressively when their knowledge stocks are similar. However, ifa
firm falls sufficiently far behind, the leadercan guarantee success and,
knowing this, the follower might as well drop out of the R&Drace. The
leading firm can continue to invest on the path to discoveryas if the
other firms did not even exist. The outcome is similar to the strategy
in a sailing race. The boat that is ahead can stay ahead by blocking
the wind for its competitors. It does not have to puton additional sail
to increase its lead, it only has to make sure that other boats cannot
overtake it. Harris and Vickers (1985a) allow for a firm to be the leader
in the patent race even if it has not accumulated the largest stock of
R&D capital if other factors such as a greater patent valuation, lower
discount rate, or lower cost of adding to its R&D stock give the firman
overwhelming advantage in the R&D competition.
A firm preempts its rivals if it has a credible strategy that guarantees
success. Under some conditions, preemption can occur even if a firm
has only slightly more experience than its rivals,or if firms in the R&D
competition begin with an equal footing, provided that one of the firms
values the prize more than others, has a lower discount rate,or a lower
cost of accumulating knowledge. The forces that determinepreemp-
tion in these dynamic patent races differ from the forces in Gilbert and
Newbery (1982), where a dominant firm can preempt rivals ina bidding
war for a patent because it has more to gain from winning the patent. In
these dynamic models, preemption occurs becauseone firm has a lead
in a patent race that it will maintain if another firm attempts to threaten
its position. Knowing this, rival firms have no hope of winning and
should abandon the race.3 Furthermore, entry of additional competi-
tors in the R&D race should have no effect on the pace of R&D invest-
ment by the leader if the new competitors are sufficiently far behind.
If discovery is uncertain at each point in time, preemption is less
likely to occur even if the probability of discovery increases witha
firm's experience. A firm that is ahead cannot guarantee that it willwin
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Harris and Vickers (1987) and Lippman and McCardle (1987)analyze
patent races with two or more stages and exponentialdiscovery prob-
abilities within each stage. A firm is ahead in the technology raceif it
completes a stage before its rival. With stochastic discovery alagging
firm can catch up or even leapfrog its rivals. Nonetheless, inthese mod-
els of dynamic R&D competition, a leader is more likelythan a follower
to win the ultimate prize, because completing a stagetypically gives
the firm an incentive to increase, or at least not decrease, its investment
in R&D.
Many of these models suggest that the dynamics of R&Dcompetition
tend to reinforce dominance; the firm that is ahead in thetechnological
race invests more in R&D than dofollowers. Even if the leader can-
not preempt competition entirely, it has a higherprobability of win-
ning, and this can reinforce the knowledge gap that separatesit from
its rivals. Doraszelski (2003) shows that this is far from ageneral result,
He considers a model in which the probability of success isexponential
at any point in time with a success rate thatdepends on both current
and cumulative R&D expenditures. The model is similar in appearance
to Reinganum's (1981) model of a patent racewith an exponential dis-
covery probability, except that the success rateis an increasing function
of the firm's cumulative R&D expenditures. This simple twist makes
the model much more difficult to solve, and most of theresults rely on
numerical simulations.
The simulations show that the more complicated discoveryprob-
ability can support a wide range of competitive behavior in a patent
race. In particular, a firm that lags arival in cumulative R&D experience
may optimally invest more than itsrival to catch up. The reason why
is intuitive. Because the probability of success increaseswith a firm's
cumulative experience, a firm that is in the lead can rest on itslaurels
and allow its large knowledge stock, rather than a high rateof current
R&D expenditure, to produce an innovation. This"knowledge effect"
gives a follower the opportunity to catch up by spending more onR&D.
When the knowledge effect is large, the dynamics of the patent race
do not reinforce dominance and there is instead an equalizationeffect.
Firms with less cumulative R&D experience work harder to catch up to
firms with larger knowledge stocks, while firms with largeknowledge
stocks tend to scale back their expenditures on R&D and coast onthe
value created by their past investments.
Doraszelski (2003) also shows that a firm may increase or decrease
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stock and firms may or may not compete most severely when their
knowledge stocks are equal. Specific results depend on the shape of
the success probability as a function of R&D experience. If the success
probability is a concave function of cumulative R&D, then there are
diminishing returns to experience and the knowledge effect implies
that a follower always invests more than the leader in R&D. If the suc-
cess probability is a convex function of cumulative R&D, then R&D
generates increasing returns, which gives a firm an incentive to invest
and build up its knowledge capital. Even in this case, Doraszelski's
simulations show that a follower has an incentive to invest to catch up
to the leader once its own knowledge stock becomes sufficiently large.
Predictions of the equilibrium outcomes of patent races dependon
the precise nature of the discovery technology When experience is criti-
cal to innovation and there is little or no uncertainty in the discovery
process, a firm that is ahead in the R&D competition can maintain its
lead and guarantee success. Knowing this, other firms may choose to
abandon the R&D race without a fight. Preemption is more difficult
when discovery is uncertain, and in some cases a firm that is behind in
the R&D race has incentives to work harder and close the gap that sepa-
rates it from the current leader. Under these circumstances the dynam-
ics of R&D competition can create incentives for R&D investments that
erode the position of market leaders.
R&D Incentives without Exclusive Property Rights
The theoretical results described so far assume that the innovator has
an exclusive and perpetual right to exploit her invention, perhaps
because the invention is rewarded with a long-lived patent that pro-
vides effective protection against imitators. We would expect the theo-
retical predictions to depend on this exclusivity assumption, although
that is not necessarily true. A pure monopolist's incentives to invent do
not depend on whether the monopolist has exclusive rights because by
assumption there is no one else who can compete in either the product
market or in R&D.
Without exclusive rights, the incentives for competing firms to invest
in R&D depend on the extent of competition that would occur among
firms who succeed in developing the new technology The. incentive to
invest in R&D is low if competition post-invention would dissipate all
or most of the profits. But this intuition can be misleading. Suppose that
firms invest in process R&D to reduce marginal production costs from176 Gilbert
c, to c1 < c0. Moreover, suppose that if two or morefirms have the new
technology, they would behave as perfect competitors and the result-
ing price would equal their marginal cost. In this case, if one firmhas
already developed the new technology no rational second firm would
invest in R&D. A second inventor would earn no net revenue withthe
new technology and would bear the costsof R&D. The first firm to
invent therefore has effective exclusivity because no rational second
firm would invest. Of course this presumes that firms invest rationally
in R&D and that they observe whether a firm has succeeded in R&D
before they invest.
The incentives to invest in R&D without exclusive rights depend on
the intensity of competition before and after innovation.'4Following
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b), consider the case of an oligopoly com-
prised of N identical firms, each of which has pre-innovation marginal
cost, c0. The firms sell a homogenous product at price p.Each firm can
lower its marginal cost to c1 < c0 by investing in R&D. Suppose the
innovation is drastic, meaning that the profit-maximizing price for a
monopolist with marginal cost c, is less than c0. In this event competi-
tion wifi occur only among the firms that invest successfully in R&D.
Index the firms by i= 1,...,Nand suppose that n firms invest in
R&D. Omitting the cost of R&D, each firm makes a gross profitexclud-
ing the cost of R&D equal to
,(c1, n)=(p - c,)q(p),
where the price depends on the number of firms that develop the new
process and the nature of the competition betweenthem and q(p) is the
output of firm i. If R&D incurs a cost K, and the firms are symmetric,
then the largest number of firms that can invest in R&D and earn a
profit is the largest number n for which
1(pc1)Q(p)K,
n
where Q(p) is the total output of all the firms. If a firm is maximizing
profits, its price-cost margin will be inversely related to its firm-specific
elasticity of demand, e This is the elasticity of the demand curve faced
by the firm and is typically more elastic than the market demand curve.
For example, if the firm maximizes its profits under the assumption
that other firms do not change their outputs, then=ne, where e is the
elasticity of demand for the entire market and n is the number of firms
that successfully invent. In this case,
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p-c1 1 1
pefflE (2)
Suppose the R&D break-even constraint (1) holds with equality Then
substituting equation (1) in (2) gives
nK 1
pQne (3)
The left-hand-side of (3) is the aggregate R&D intensity for the entire
industry: the ratio of total industry R&D to total sales. The right-
hand-side is clearly decreasing in n, implying that the industry R&D
intensity is a decreasing function of the number of firms that invest
in R&D.15 Since the firms are identical, the firm-level R&D intensity is
also decreasing in the number of firms that invest in R&D. Under the
assumptions of this model a statistical cross-section of otherwise identi-
cal industries should reveal that firms in markets with fewer firms have
higher R&D intensities. A strong dose of caution is appropriate here,
because even if the data were consistent with the theoretical model, we
could not conclude that an increase in market concentration in any par-
ticular industry would increase R&D intensity, because concentration is
an equilibrium condition determined by characteristics of the industry
and the R&D technology.
In a social optimum, R&D investment should occur onlyonce and
the results should be made available to all of the firms in the industry.
The knowledge created by the R&D is a public good and can be used by
anyone. In this example, all of the n firms invest in R&D. Competition
without exclusive rights results in redundant R&D expenditures when-
ever two or more firms invest in R&D for the same technology. It would
be better for one firm to invest in R&D and to share the results of that
knowledge with others, which would avoid (n- 1)K in R&D costs.
In this example, R&D causes a discrete reduction in marginal produc-
tion cost. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) obtain additional results, with
some additional assumptions, when marginal cost is a declining func-
tion of investment in R&D. If the elasticity of demand and the elasticity
of marginal cost with respect to R&D are constant, they show that the
level of investment in R&D by each firm is a decreasing function of the
number of competitors. Consequently, the actual level of cost reduction
by each firm decreases with the number of firms that are active in R&D.
As in the discrete model, the total investment in R&D (nK) increases,178 Gilbert
but the actual output of innovation, as measured by the reduction in
cost, is a declining function of the number of firms that activelyinvest
in R&D.16 Summarizing:
With nonexciusive rights to process innovations, competition can be harmful to
R&D because it can reduce incentives for cost-reduction by each firm and result
in redundant R&D expenditures.
In this model the incentives for innovation in an industry with n
firms are similar to the incentives for n small monopolies to invest in
cost-reducing R&D. Larger numbers of firms correspond to smaller
monopolies in this analogy. A monopolist's incentive to invest in cost-
reducing R&D is proportional to the firm's output. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that as the number of firms increases, the level of cost-reduction
falls, precisely because the output per firm decreases. Furthermore, a
monopoly in R&D can avoid redundant R&D expenditures.
R&D is unlike expenditures on conventional goods and services
because R&D has properties of a public good. After discovery of a new
product or process, others can use the invention at a cost that is a frac-
tion of the cost of the original discovery. With nonexclusive intellectual
property rights, firms may waste economic resources by investing in
R&D to create redundant inventions. Models of R&D competition with
nonexclusive intellectual property rights illustrate the hazards of using
R&D expenditures as a proxy for innovative output. R&D expenditures
and actual R&D outputs need not even move in the same direction
when the number of firms that actively compete in R&D in an indus-
try increases or decreases. Exclusive intellectual property rightswould
encourage a firm either to develop the invention at alarge scale or
license the invention to others, which economizes on redundant R&D
expenditures.
Managerial Incentives for Innovation
Many of the models we have discussed so far predict a. monotonic rela-
tionship between the extent of competition and innovative output. For
example, in the patent race model with exponential discovery probabil-
ities, more R&D competitors advances the expected date at which dis-
covery occurs (e.g. Reinganum 1985). Inthe Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980b)
model of cost-reducing R&D with nonexciusive property rights, increas-
ing the number of competitors reduces the amount of cost-reduction.
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the opposite direction. There is an intuitive argument that moderate
levels of competition should be most effective in promoting innovation.
In highly competitive markets the incentive to innovatemay be low
because the innovator's small scale of operationsmay limit its benefit
from a new technology. In markets thatare close to monopolies, the
Arrow replacement effect should dominate. To the extent that market
concentration is a reasonable proxy for the degree of competition, this
would leave intermediate levels of market concentrationas the most
fertile environments for innovative activity17 However, few models
that rely solely on the pursuit of profit-maximization generate irinova-
tion incentives that peak at moderate levels of competition.18
A theme that resonates in the popular press is that monopolies have
little incentive to innovate. For example, Steve Jobs, the CEO of Apple
Computer, said "[W]hat's the point of focusingon making the product
even better when the only company you can take business away from
is yourself?"19 Firms have to innovate to stay ahead when otherscan
develop new competitive products. "Only the paranoid survive"the
motto of Andrew Grove when he was the CEO of the Intel Corpora-
tionis testimony to the vigor of dynamic competition. In markets
with strong intellectual property rights, Arrow's replacement effect
reinforces this view. Monopolies that are protected from innovation
competition are reluctant to innovate because they merely replaceone
profit flow with another, while new competitors capture the entire ben-
efit of an innovation. But with nonexciusive rights, competitivemar-
kets limit incentives to innovate because the innovatorcan appropriate
only a fraction of the total benefits.
In the search for a more general theory of innovation incentives, and
perhaps a theory in which competition motivates innovationeven with
nonexclusive intellectual property rights, information asymmetries
between owners and managers could play an important role. Leiben-
stein (1966) argued that managers do not apply the effortnecessary to
reach the frontier of the firm's production function, and this slack is
greater for managers who are not exposed to significant competition.
In modem terms, managerial slack is the result of asymmetric informa-
tion in a principal-agent hierarchy. The owners of firms (the principals)
want managers, acting as their agents, to exert effort to run the firm in
an efficient manner. This effort could include investing in and thinking
creatively about new processes and products. The activity of invention
requires ingenuity, hard work, and risk-taking, and often requiresman-
agers to make changes in operating procedures that are stressful for all180 Gilbert
and impose severe hardships on some workers. Hicks (1935)said it well
when he wrote that "The best of all monopoly profits is a quietlife."
Martin (1993) develops a model in which owners offer incentives to
privately informed managers to prod them to invest in cost-reducing
R&D. In other respects the model is similar to that in Dasguptaand
Stiglitz (1980b) and indeed the model predictions are alsosimilar.
Investment in cost-reducing R&D is a decreasing functionof the num-
ber of firms in the industry. The greater the number of competitors,the
higher is the equilibrium level of the marginal cost. Private information,
alone, does not change the result that competition lowers incentives
for cost-reducing R&D in the absence of exclusive intellectual property
rights.
Schmidt (1997) and Aghion et al. (1999) generate strongerresults
about the disciplining effect of competition by allowing forthe pos-
sibility of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy has punitive consequencesfor a
firm's managers, who are at least temporarily outof a job, and they
exert effort to avoid this unhappy state. In Aghion etal. (1999), adopt-
ing a new technology imposes an adjustment cost,in addition to the
direct expense associated with the technology, that managers (orengi-
neers) wish to minimize. Innovation keeps the company moreefficient
and reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy. All else equal,competition
makes bankruptcy more likely. In their model managers innovate more
in competitive markets because competition holdsmanagers' feet to
the fire. The risk of bankruptcy is low in monopolisticmarkets, and so
is the need to innovate, hence managers of monopolyfirms can enjoy
the quiet life.
The model in Aghion et al. (1999) illustrates howmonopoly profits
can shield managers from thehard work of being innovative, but it does
not lead to a robust conclusion that competitionpromotes innovation.
As the authors note, managerial preferences coulddiverge from profit
maximization because managers are loathe to innovate or because they
are "techno-freaks" who enjoy adoptingthe latest new technology. If
managers have an inclination tooverspend on new technologies, com-
petition would slow innovation by making bankruptcy morelikely and
forcing managers to be more efficient and innovate less.The effects of
competition on managerial performance also depend onwhether firms
are active in credit markets.Managers may have to act efficiently to
avoid bankruptcy if their firms are saddled with debt.
In Aghion et al. (1999), competition affects managerial payoffssolely
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its from cost reduction in the utility function of the firm'sowners and
derives conditions under which competition leads to moreor less effort
by managers to reduce costs. In Schmidt's model, greater competition
has two opposing consequences for managerial effort and innovation.
By reducing each firm's demand, greater competition lowers the incen-
tive to innovate, as in the models developed by Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980b) and Martin (1993). Greater competition also increases the risk of
bankruptcy, which encourages managers to innovate topreserve their
jobs and makes it easier for the owner to induce additional effort.2° By
increasing the risk of bankruptcy, competition results in more innova-
tive effort. But competition also lowers the return to a cost-reducing
innovation by reducing the output of each firm. Thus, there are two
effects that act in different directions. Under reasonable assumptions,
the output effect should dominate if competition is sufficiently intense,
which suggests that investment in cost-reducing effort should peak at
some intermediate level of market concentration. Thus Schmidt's model
can generate a relationship between innovation and competition that
has an "inverted-U" shape, as opposed to the monotonic relationship
in most other models of innovation that ignore managerial incentives.
Although these results are insightful, this line of inquiry would benefit
from additional theoretical and empirical research. Furthermore, the
results include the usual caveat that R&D investment can be redundant
with nonexclusive intellectual property rights, and maximizing R&D
effort is not the same as maximizing innovative output.
Other Theories and Extensions
Most economic models of the innovation process implicitlyassume
that firms' proclivities to innovate are independent of the firms' iden-
tities, although there is a small economics literature that emphasizes
the effects of asymmetric firm characteristics (e.g., Boone 2000a). The
assumption that all firms are equal when it comes to innovation is at
odds with much of the competitive strategy literature, which empha-
sizes differences in the abilities and desires of firms to exploit techno-
logical opportunities.
Some types of innovations are potentially disruptive to existingorga-
nizational structures within industries (see, e.g., Teece 1986). They intro-
duce radically different technologies and are difficult to conceptualize
as simple substitutes for existing processes and products, and firms
react differently to the challenge of adapting to these new technologies.182 Gilbert
Institutional commitments to existing products or production methods
can be as great a factor in the incentive toinnovate as purely profit-
driven considerations, such as the problem of self-induced obsolescence
described by Arrow (1962) and others. Such commitments can take the
form of firm-specific skifis, investments in complementary assets,and a
preference for established ways of doing business. Moreover, even if all
firms have the same incentive to engage in research and development,
it is highly unlikely that all firms are equal in the effectivenessof their
innovative efforts. Firms may possess private information about R&D
opportunities or have unique assets that are related to innovation suc-
cess. Variance in effectiveness alsomakes it difficult to posit a strong
relationship between industry structure and innovation.
Henderson (1993) describes the experience of semiconductor firms
that were faced with new photolithography technology for making
large-scale integrated circuits. A crucial technology was the optics
required to project complex circuit layouts onto semiconductor wafers.
Camera companies such as Canon and Nikon had an advantage in
these technologies and threatened to take business away fromestab-
lished integrated circuit equipment manufacturers. Although firms in
both the optics and semiconductor industries had incentives to intro-
duce the new process technologies, the winner depended in part on
the ability of established companies to adapt to new technologieswith
which they had little experience.
The photolithography example presents a quite different take on the
notion of a drastic innovation. Here, the innovation is drasticbecause
it requires a change in the management of innovation withinthe firm.
Henderson calls these "architectural" innovations. An innovation can
be drastic in the architectural sense even if it is not drastic in the sense
of creating a new monopoly price that is less than the oldmarginal
cost.
There are many examples of architectural innovations. Electronic
watches required upscale mechanical watchmakers to emphasize
even more the value of their products asjewelry instead of time-keep-
ing devices. The rise of the Internet caused Microsoft to reorganizeits
research efforts to put more emphasis on browsers and servers. Camera
makers and ifim companies have had to adapt to digital photography.
Some, such as Kodak, managed the transition with partial success,while
Polaroid was a casualty of the digital revolution. Other market leaders,
such as General Motors, DEC and IBM, have had bureaucraticprob-
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offer several examples of once dominant firms that lost their innova-
tive edge. These include Xerox, which lost market share to Canon and
other competitors, the mechanized excavator market where Caterpil-
lar and Deere took over from Bucyrus-Erie, the decline of Searsand
the ascent of Wal-Mart, and DEC's failure to substitute PCs for itsonce
dominant position in minicomputers. Henderson (1994) observed that
some pharmaceutical companies maintained their dominance for half
a century because they were able to continually remake themselves.
Drug companies encourage scientists to publish. In the best companies,
eminence is a criterion for promotion. They balanced science andcom-
mercial success in ways that enhanced their abilities to respondto new
technological opportunities.
The history of the personal computer disk drive industry isa case
study of disruptive innovation. The industry experienceda succession
of significant innovations that greatly increased storage capacities and
reduced costs. Christensen (1997) observed that once-dominant firms
in this industry frequently lost their positionas other firms leapfrogged
their technological capabilities. He attributed this toan informational
bias that encourages leading firms to make only incremental innova-
tions that better serve their existing customer base, foregoingmore rad-
ical innovations because they are ill-suited for their presentcustomers.
However, one does not need informational distortions to explain this
type of behavior. Market-based theories, such as Reinganum's (1983)
model of innovation with exponential discovery probabilities,suggest
that dominant firms often have no greater incentives thannew rivals
to introduce drastic innovations, and their incentive may be distinctly
less. Thus, it should not be surprising that new leading firms special-
ize in incremental innovations while major innovationscome from
new entrants. Moreover, in an industry with an incumbent monopolist
and several potential entrants, it does not follow that the incumbentis
the most likely firm to introduce a new innovation,even if the incum-
bent invests more than other firms. For illustration,suppose there is
an incumbent and eight potential competitors, each with the same
R&D technology and the inctimbent invests twiceas much as any
single potential competitor. The incumbent's probability of being the
next successful innovator is only 20 percent. The odds are four toone
that a new competitor will be the next innovator. Informational biases
could explain the failure of leading firms in the disk drive industryto
maintain their dominant positions, but theyare clearly not the only
explanation.184 Gilbert
Nearly all economic models that relate market structure to incentives
for innovation assume that the firm's capacity for R&D iseither gen-
erated through its own expenditures or purchased in themarket, for
example by licensing technology from others. These modelstypically
ignore the fact that research output depends on thehuman capital of the
people who work for the firm, which in turn depends ontheir education
and experience. There are well-known stories of innovativefirms that
were founded by scientistsand engineers who owed their experience
to employment in other, technologicallyprogressive firms. An example
is the sequence of innovation in semiconductortechnology that began
at Bell Laboratories and then moved to ShockleySemiconductor. Key
executives at Shockley soon departed to form FairchildSemiconduc-
tor, and subsequently left Fairchild to startsuccessful new firms such
as AMD, Intel, Intersil andNational Semiconductor (which ultimately
bought and then sold Fairchild). Studies of market structureand inno-
vation in this industry should account for the marketconditions that
created the human capital that went on to found these othersuccessful
enterprises. For example, suppose that there is a highly innovativeand
competitive telecommunications sector, and suppose furtherthat many
of the management teams in these companies trace theiremployment
histories to a giant such as Bell Laboratories or IBM. Is it correct to con-
clude that competitive markets promote innovation in thisexample?
Perhaps a better interpretation is that competitivemarkets were useful
only in a more limited sense to exploit innovations whoseseeds were
sown at Bell Labs or IBM.
Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) is one of very few attempts
to systematically examine how corporateexperience has shaped inno-
vation. The authors trace the employment histories offounders and key
executives in a database of several hundred firmsformed with ven-
ture capital financing from 1986 to1999.21 They use the term "entre-
preneurial spawners" to describe companies that are at the rootsof the
corporate histories of key executives at many new startups.Working
backward through the resumes of key executives, the authorsfind that
70 of the startup companies in their database had managementteams
with prior experience at IBM, 60 at AT&T, 55 at Sun Microsystems,and
so on; 48 publicly-traded companieshad employees who became key
executives at more than ten different startups.
The authors consider two anecdotal explanations for entrepreneur-
ial spawning, which they call the Xerox story and theFairchild story.
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not recognize the market potential for ideas that fall outside their core
business. In the Fairchild story, key employees acquire human capital
and form entrepreneurial networks that facilitate new startups. They
find evidence that is consistent with the Fairchild story. In particular,
they find that companies, many of which were located in Silicon Valley,
spawned other startups when their growth rates slowed, suggesting
that expected rewards at these companies were not sufficient to retain
their top executives.
This type of research is very different from studies that relate R&D to
present market structures. Yet the history of human capital formation is
an important component in the understanding of innovative companies
and markets. While there is clearly much more that needs to be doneon
this important topic, the analysis in Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein
identifies some of the building blocks for a theory of corporate experi-
ence and its effects on innovation.
Innovation Diversity
Competition in R&D is a source of diversity in research paths that can
be difficult for a single firm to duplicate. This is the flip side of the argu-
ment that monopoly can avoid the redundant expenditures on R&D
that are likely to occur in competitive markets. In theory, a single firm
can pursue multiple R&D paths, but in practice it can be difficult for
a single firm to maintain the diversity of inquiry that can character-
ize truly independent R&D. Andrew Grove, the former CEO of Intel,
described how he wanted to keep his options open by pursuing dif-
ferent R&D programs for microprocessors that utilized RISC (Reduced
Instruction Set Computing) and CISC (Complex Instruction Set Com-
puting) technology. In the end, Intel abandoned RISC in favor of CISC
because it was too difficult to pursue both options simultaneously
(Grove 1996).
Innovation diversity is an elusive concept. Independent research-
ers develop capabilities and "hunches" that are difficult to replicate
within a single organization. It is difficult to model the value of this
type of diversity.It is not obvious that reducing the number of firms
in an industry reduces the number of independent R&D paths. That
follows if we assume that each firm takes a single R&D path, but that
need not be the case. It is common for firms to pursue several research
paths. Pharmaceutical research companies test thousands of molecular
combinations in search of new medicines. Semiconductor companies186 Gilbert
experiment with different manufacturing processes for wafer fabrica-
tion. Sah and Stiglitz (1987) consider a model in which firms can choose
any number of independent R&D projects, each ofwhich succeeds with
the same probability They show that under some conditions the equi-
librium number of R&D paths is independent of the structure of the
industry. Their result requires several strong assumptions. It must be
the case that: (1) the value of being the only firm that has a success-
ful project is independent of the number of firms in the market and of
the distribution of unsuccessful projects in the market; (2) the value of
another R&D project to a firm is zero if any other firm has a successful
project; and (3) the value of another R&D project to a firm is zero if that
firm has a successful project.
In these models, a single firm can make up for the loss of diversity
by increasing the number of projects undertaken at that firm. There is,
however, much more to innovation diversity than counting the number
of R&D projects in the industry. Anecdotal evidence, such as Grove's
recounting of Intel's experiences with fflSC and CISC technologies,
suggests that organizational factors limit the extent to which a firm can
diversify its innovation efforts. Research programs that appear to be
redundant may hide important differences, and combining such pro-
grams may risk the elimination of an alternative pathof discovery. As
a matter of theory, it is also possible thatprofit-maximizing competi-
tive firms would choose research paths that result in excessive diversity
from the perspective of economic efficiency, as firms attempt to differ-
entiate their research activities in order to minimize competition.23
The Effects of Scale
Joseph Schumpeter praised monopoly as a source of innovation because
monopoly provides a more stable platform to engage in R&D and a
dominant firm can more fully exploit economies of scale in R&D. R&D
investment is risky and monopoly profits can cushion the uncertain
payoff of R&D. Furthermore, most firms finance R&D with internally
generated funds, so monopoly profits can translate into more dollars to
spend on R&D.24 Firms are likely to know more than investors about
R&D prospects. Investors would be reluctant to invest in risky R&D
projects if they believe that firms will use internally generated funds
for projects that have high expected payoffs and will turn to the capital
market only for projects that have lower payoffs. This raises the pos-
sibility that monopoly is beneficial for R&D because monopoly profits
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These observations are important, butmay oversimplify the benefits
of monopoly profits for R&D investment. Internal fundsare often suf-
ficient to finance R&D investments inmany industries, even industries
that are workably competitive. Firmscan diversify their R&D risks by
pursuing different R&D programs and stockholderscan protect them-
selves against risky R&D projects by holdinga portfolio of firms. Phar-
maceutical research is a case in point. About 70 percent of drugR&D
programs fail to pay back the cost of the R&D and the average cost of
bringing a successful drug to market isenormous. The risk of failure
is great, even for a large pharmaceutical R&D firm, howeverinvestors
can diversify their risk by holding a portfolio of several pharmaceutical
companies.
III.Empirical Studies of R&D
The previous section attempted to tease outsome theoretical conclu-
sions about the relationships between competition, firm size andinno-
vation. It is a difficult though not entirely unrewarding task. Tothe
extent that the literature yields any predictive results, they dependon
the characteristics of innovations, the R&D technologies, and theindus-
tries in which R&D occurs; the details matter.25 In this sectionwe turn to
empirical studies of market structure and innovation. What doesexpe-
rience tell us about the most fertile environment for generatinginven-
tions and for developing their potential? How do R&D expenditures
and outcomes vary with market structures?
Industries Studies of Market Structure and R&D
A very large number of empirical studies test the relationship between
firm size or industry concentration and R&D. Indeed, Aghion andTirole
(1994) call this the second most tested hypothesis in industrialorganiza-
tion, after the relationship between profits and firm size/concentration.
There was a surge of empirical researchon the Schumpeterian hypoth-
esis that R&D is related to firm size and competition, beginningwith
studies by Scherer and Mansfield in the mid-1960s. We listmany of
these early studies and their key observations in tables 6.1 and6.2. The
first table lists studies that relate R&D to firm size. The second doesthe
same for market concentration, a commonly used, but highly imper-
fect, surrogate for competition. There isno compelling evidence from
the studies listed in the first table that R&D intensity (theratio of R&D
expenditures or innovative output to sales) increases with firmsize188 Gilbert
Table 6.1
Early statistical studies of R&D and firm size
No evidence of R&D intensity
(R&D/Sales) increasing with firm
size. Some evidence of lower
R&D intensity for largest firms.
Significant inter-industry differ-
ences. No correlation with profits
or diversification.
Some evidence of declining R&D
intensity for largest firms.
No correlation between size and
R&D intensity above a threshold
level. Some evidence that small
firms account for a disproportion-
ate share of initial inventions.
No effect of size above a moderate
threshold level for 101 chemical
firms.
Largest firms spent disproportion-
ately more on basic research, but
not on other R&D.
R&D/sales and patents/sales
roughly constant for most indus-
tries.
Considerable variation in the elas-
ticity of R&D spending with respect
to sales across industries.
No correlation between firm size
and R&D intensity after controlling
for fixed effects.
No effect of size on R&D intensity
above a moderate threshold level.
R&D/sales increase with line of
business size.
Innovations/employee and innova-
tions/sales greater for large firms in
imperfectly competitive industries,
lower for large firms in competitive
industries. No significant differ-
ence in the quality of innovations
by large and small firms.
Author Measures of R&D Conclusions
Scherer (1965) Patents, R&D
employment
Mansfield (1968) R&D expenditures
Mansfield et al. (1977) R&D expenditure,
innovations
Link (1980) Rate of return on
R&D
Mansfield (1981) R&D expenditures
Scherer (1983) R&D expenditures,
patents
Bound et al. (1984) R&D expenditures
Scott (1984) R&D expenditures
Culbertson & Mueller R&D employment,
(1985) expenditures,
patents
Lunn & Martin (1986) R&D expenditures
Acs & Audretsch (1987)Number of
innovationsTable 6.2







































No correlation between R&D inten-
sity and concentration.
Positive correlation with concentra-
tion, then falling after C4 of 50-55%
after controlling for industry effects.
R&D intensity greatest in industries
with moderate barriers to entry.
Some evidence of positive correlation
at low levels of market concentration,
but none above moderate levels.
Concentrated industries spent less on
basic research; otherwise concentra-
tion had no significant effect on R&D.
No correlation between concentration
and R&D after controlling for fixed
effects.
Returns to process R&D increased
with concentration. Returns to prod-
uct R&D independent of concentra-
tion.
No statistically significant correlation
with concentration.
Positive correlation with concentra-
tion in food manufacturing industries
up to a threshold C4 of about 60%.
No effect of concentration on R&D
after accounting for differences in
appropriability.
Concentration positively related to
R&D intensity in industries with
low barriers to imitation, negatively
related to R&D in industries with
high barriers to imitation.
Process patents in low-tech indus-
tries positively related to concentra-
tion. No effect of concentration on
product patents, or process patents in
high-tech industries.
R&D/sales increased with market
share and C4 index in low-tech
industries.
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above some threshold. Kamien and Schwartz (1982), in their review of
the early empirical literature, concluded that "R&D activity, measured
by either input or output intensity. appears to increase with firm size
up to a point and then level off or decline. . ."(p.103). The threshold
size for effective R&D varies widely across industries (Freeman, 1982).
Baldwin and Scott (1987), summarizing many studies, conclude that:
"the preponderance of evidence .. .indicatesthat economies of scale
in industrial R&D, of both the firm and the research establishment,
are in most cases exhausted well below the largestfirm and research
establishment size examined. The studies that have found a pervasive
positive relationship between size and R&D intensity are those draw-
ing on samples including companies of widely ranging sizes and with
little or no control for industry effects. . .The Schumpeterian hypothesis
relating innovation to firm size appears to hold up if interpreted as a
threshold one, but does not imply that giant corporations are essential
for vigorous R&D in most fields" (p. 87).
Early studies of the relationship between market concentration and
R&D spending or innovative output reported in table 6.2 showed
some tendency for R&D intensity to be larger in moderately concen-
trated industries, however these effects typically disappeared in more
refined statistical studies that controlled for industry effects. Begin-
ning in the mid-1980s, a second wave of researchers returned to the
Schumpeterian hypothesis using more sophisticated econometric tech-
niques and improved data on technological opportunities. Using Fed-
eral Trade Commission 1974 line of business data for 437 firms, Scott
(1984) found no significant relationship between market structure and
R&D intensity after controlling for effects that were specific to firms
and their industries. Also using FTC line of business data, Levin et al.
(1985) initially found a statistically significant "inverted-U" relation-
ship between industry concentration and both R&D intensity and
the rate of introductions of innovations. The relationship peaked at
a C4 index (the share of the largest four firms inthe industry) of about
0.5-0.6; this is consistent with Scherer's (1967) earlier results. The
authors then included eight variables constructed from the Yale R&D
survey to measure technological opportunity andappropriability
for each firm. These included, for example, the effectiveness of appro-
priation mechanisms such as secrecy, lead time and ease of imitation.
Inclusion of these variables dramatically lowered the significance of
the concentration variables in the R&D regression, while technologi-
cal opportunity and appropriability remained significant, with theWhere Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate? 191
expected signs. These econometric studies suggest that whatever
relationship exists at a general economy-wide level between indus-
try structure and R&D is masked by differences across industries in
technological opportunities, demand, and the appropriability of inven-
tions. As Baldwin and Scott (1987) note, "The most common feature
of the few R&D and innovation analyses that have sought to control
for the underlying technological environment isa dramatic reduction
in the observed impact of the Schumpeterian size and marketpower
variables."
Most of the early empirical studies identified in tables 6.1 and 6.2 suf-
fer from several of the following problems.
Limited Data on Innovative Activity and Market Competition. Many
of the studies that relate market structure to Innovation relyon R&D
expenditures, often at highly aggregated levels. R&D expenditure isan
input to innovation. As we have seen from models of innovation with
nonexclusive property rights, greater R&D expenditures do not trans-
late directly into greater innovative output and indeed the oppositecan
be true. Market environments with nonexciusive intellectual property
rights may generate redundant R&D expenditures that increase indus-
try costs with no additional benefits for innovative output.
As an alternative, several studies focus on patent countsas a mea-
sure of innovative output. Unfortunately, the correspondence between
patents and useful new products or processes is also weak in many
industries. Patent values are highly skewed, with most providing little
or no commercial benefit, and in industries such as semiconductors,
patenting is often done for defensive purposes and is not a particularly
good indication of the direction of new technology.26
A complete analysis of the determinants of innovation activity would
require estimates of the expected values of discoveries and dataon the
R&D activities of all potential innovators. Innovations often come from
unexpected sources, including from firms in unrelated industries and
sometimes from individual inventors. Henderson's (1993) example of
innovation in photolithography is an example of one industry (optics)
generating innovations for use in another industry (semiconductor
fabrication). Culbertson and Mueller (1985) note that most Innovation
in food processing came from firms in other industries, foreign firms
and individual inventors. It is exceedingly difficult to identify all of the
potential sources of innovation for many new products andprocesses.
The sources of invention are numerous, scattered and varied.192 Gilbert
Firms often purchase rights to innovations made by others.27The
effects of market forces can differ significantly for investment in own-
R&D and for purchases of innovations from others. For example, in a
study of R&D investment behavior by German firms, Czamitzki and
Kraft (2004) found that new entrants into industries invested more in
R&D than incumbents, a result that is inconsistent with preemptive
innovation by incumbent firms. However, in a companion study the
authors found that incumbents spent more than entrants to license
technologies from others (Czarnitzki and Kraft 2005). The exclusionary
rights embodied in a license and the greater certainty that a license will
go to the highest bidder apparently makepreemption more likely for
acquiring licenses than for investing in R&D more generally
Another serious data problem in many of these studies is the use
of market concentration as a proxy for competition. It is wellunder-
stood that markets with only a few firms can be highly competitive,
and competition can be weak in markets with many firms. Competition
depends on the levels and industry distribution of firm costs, quali-
ties, and brand recognition, on barriers to entry, on characteristics of
demand, and on whatever animal spirits might motivate managers.
Furthermore, market concentration is clearly endogenous to innova-
tion. Successful innovation by a market leader can create a firmthat
competes only weakly with other firms in the industry because ithas
superior production technology or product quality Successful inno-
vation by a firm that is far from the technological frontier can create
new competition by closing the cost or productquality gap relative to
the market leader, even though the size structure of the industry may
appear to be the same in both cases.
Failure to Distinguish Exclusive versus Nonexciusive Property
Rights.The economic theory of the incentive effects of different mar-
ket structures for innovation clearly demonstrates the importance of
exclusive rights for innovation incentives. With exclusive rights, the
theory suggests that competition promotes innovation. There are mod-
els that predict differently, such as the preemption models inGilbert
and Newbery (1982) and Fudenberg et al. (1983). However these models
require particular assumptions about market structure or the dynamics
of innovation competition and do not generalize to many other reason-
able market settings. Empirical tests of preemption do not generally
sustain the view that incumbent firms invest in ways that effectively
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et al. (1999) and Czarnitzki and Kraft (2005) for the acquisitionof
licenses. As noted above, the statistical significance ofmarket concen-
tration as a determinant of innovation often disappears whenempirical
studies account for the degree to which innovatorscan appropriate the
value of their inventions using exclusive patent rightsor other means.
Failure to Distinguish Product and Process Innovations.The theory
demonstrates that the effects of competitionon incentives to invest in
innovation can differ for process and product innovations. Thedistinc-
tion between product and process innovation is alsoimportant because
intellectual property rights are often less effective atpreventing imita-
tion for process innovations than for product innovations (Levinet al.
1987). A process innovation covers a method of production andit can be
difficult for the owner of a process patent to know ifa firm's production
infringes the owner's patent. Consequently, tradesecret is sometimes
preferred to patenting as a means to protectprocess innovations. Trade
secret protection is nonexciusive and the theory tellsus that the effects
of competition on innovation incentives differ significantly forexclu-
sive and nonexclusive intellectual property rights. Even whenprocess
innovations are patented, the patent may more closely resemblea non-
exclusive right due to ease of imitation.
Despite the potentially important differences in innovationincen-
tives for product and process innovations, few of themany empirical
studies of R&D attempt to distinguish between the two. Thereare some
exceptions. For example, Link and Lunn (1984) examined therate of
return to R&D separately for product and process innovations. They
found that returns to process R&D increased withmarket concentra-
tion. This is consistent with the theoretical relationshipbetween com-
petition and R&D in models with nonexclusive intellectualproperty
rights (e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980b). For R&D directedto new
products, they found that the rate of returnwas independent of market
concentration.
Economic theory implies that for process innovations thatare not
licensed or sold to others, the incentive to invest in R&Dshould be pro-
portional to pre-innovation output at the business unit level.Cohen and
Klepper (1996a, 1996b) develop this argument and apply thetheory to
FTC line of business data. Cohen and Klepper (1996a) find thatbusiness
unit size explains most of the variance inprocess R&D expenditures
and that sales at the firm level have virtuallyno additional explanatory
power. This result is consistent with the theoretical argument that thevalue of a process innovation that is not licensed orsold to others should
be proportional to the output of the activity towhich it is applied. This
output is related to the business unit size, notto the total size of the
firm. Cohen and Kiepper's (1996a) conclusionthat business unit size,
and not firm size, explains most of the variancein R&D expenditures
for process innovations also contradicts theSchumpeterian theory that
firm size promotes R&D because the large firm is a"more stable plat-
form" for R&D due to factors such as reliable cashflow, economies of
scale, or diversification.
The authors find additional support for thetheory that incentives
for process innovation are proportional tobusiness unit size. They
find that the relationship between R&Dexpenditure and busi-
ness unit size is weaker inindustries that experience high growth or
where licensing of innovations is common. Thesefactors allow even a
small firm to benefit from R&D, either by licensingthe innovation to
others or by applying the innovation to higherfuture output. Cohen
and Kiepper (1996b) test the relationship betweenfirm size and the pro-
pensity of firms to patent product and processinnovations. Following
Scherer (1982), they assume that a patent covers a processinnovation if
it is employed in the same industry in whichit originates, the argument
being that innovations that are kept "in-house" are morelikely to relate
to productive efficiency rather than to newproducts for sales to others.
They find that the fraction of patents that areclassified as process inno-
vations tends to increase with the size of the firm.This is also consistent
with the theory, as larger operations allow afirm to benefit more from
a process innovation.
Differences in Technological Opportunities acrossIndustries and
Time. The "second wave" of empirical research onthe Schumpeterian
hypothesis drove home the point thattechnological opportunity and
appropriability are critical to incentives for R&D and candiffer greatly
across industries and across time.A simple example illustrates the dif-
ficulty of sorting out changes in market competitionfrom changes in
technological opportunity as a determinant of R&D. Homedishwash-
ers changed little in terms offunctional characteristics or appearance
from 1960 to about the mid-1980s. Starting in themid-1980s, a number
of new models appeared with features such aswater-efficient engineer-
ing, quiet operation and sophisticated controls.Patenting in the product
classification for dishwashers accelerated rapidly aboutthis time. The
number of patents awarded in this classification heldsteady at about
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80 per year from 1975 until about 1985, after which the numberof pat-
ents awarded annually greatly increased, reaching about 300per year
in 2004. Tn the decade from 1975-1985, during whichtime the rate of
patenting was relatively low and steady, therewere three major suppli-
ers of residential built-in dishwashers and a few fringe suppliers. The
increase in patenting coincided with bothan increase inthe number of
independent suppliers and an increase in the variety of thesesuppliers
(domestic and foreign). What can we conclude from this?Not much,
because the technology changed dramaticallyover this time period and
the entry of the European firms not only increasedthe number of inde-
pendent dishwasher suppliers in the U.S., it also broughtnew ideas to
the U.S. market.
Lack of Structural Models of Innovation. Fewstatistical studies of
innovation use a structural economic model of the determinantsof inno-
vation. We expect innovation incentives to beara nonlinear relationship
to industry characteristics, and regression analyses that merelyinclude
plausible determinants of innovationare likely to generate biased esti-
mates. Unfortunately it is difficult to "nest" different theoreticalmodels
of R&D in ways that would allow the econometricianto reject some
models as having weak explanatory effects. Empirical studiesof the
relationship of prices to market structureare often constructed on stan-
dard models, such as Bertrand-Nash pricing forstatic games with dif-
ferentiated products. The economic theory of innovationcompetition
does not establish a clear favorite model forempirical analysis. A case
could be made for the replacement effect models ofArrow (1962) and
Reinganum (1985) when innovations enjoy exclusive intellectualprop-
erty rights, and for a model such as Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980b)when
intellectual property rights are nonexclusive, but these modelsare not
appropriate descriptions for all market situations.
The lack of a structural model of innovation alsoinvites estima-
tion errors because few variables are trulyexogenous determinants of
innovation.28 Empirical studies do not makea clear case that market
structure affects R&D, but there is little doubt that R&D isa cause of
market structure, and this endogeneity greatly complicatesthe anal-
ysis. For example, Phillips (1971) notes that the technology forearly
commercial aircraft largely came fromexogenous sources and nei-
ther size nor market power explained the relativeR&D performances
of the industry's firms. However, relativesuccess in innovation was
the primary cause of the growth ofsome firms and the decline ofothers, and hence of growing concentration.Mansfield (1983) found
that process innovations led to radical increasesin minimum optimal
scale in steel and cement, and less dramatic increasesfor other indus-
tries. Thus, R&D caused higher concentrationin these industries. In
other industries, Mansfield found that productinnovations were con-
centration decreasing.
Failure to Control for Other Confounding Factors.With the many
factors that influence the opportunity andincentives for innovation,
the need for "natural experiments" that enableempirical researchers
to filter out the effects of unobservedcovariates is particularly
important. Most of the empirical studies ofmarket structure and inno-
vation use large cross-section or panel data sets,for which many fac-
tors vary in the population that areinadequately controlled for by the
econometriciafl.
More recently, a third wave of researchers hasdescended on the ques-
tion of the relationship between market structureand R&D. Compared
to earlier studies, these researchers use moreextensive data, better
empirical methods to control for simultaneity ofmarket structure and
R&D, and pay somewhat more attention to thetheory. Blundell, Griffith
and Van Reenen (1999) test the Schumpeterianhypothesis using firm-
specific data, innovation counts from the SciencePolicy Research Unit
and patent data. The authors control for industryheterogeneity and
the simultaneous determination of R&D andmarket structure by using
lagged variables in a long data panel. Theyalso check their results
using separate industry studies. The authorsfind that more concen-
trated industries produce fewer innovations, butwithin industries, the
larger firms introduced more innovationsand had the largest increase
in market values. They argue that thisprovides some evidence for pre-
emptive R&D by dominant firms. They find nocorrelation between
firm size and the significance of innovations and noevidence that cash
flow is a significant determinant of innovation.
Their study relies on sophisticated econometrictechnique, but it does
not entirely dispel concerns that arisefrom endogenous variables and
industry differences. The authors do notemploy direct measures of
appropriability or technological opportunity and they donot distin-
guish product and process innovations. The authors arguethat the use
of lagged variables in their long panel is atheoretically valid approach
to account for endogenous variablesand industry differences, but this
is valid only if appropriabiity andtechnological opportunity do not
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change over time. Our simple example of R&D in the dishwashermar-
ket suggests that this may not be a reasonable assumption.
An ideal test of the effect of competition on innovation would be
a natural experiment in which external and unforeseen events cause
a discrete change in the extent of competition in an industry with no
other consequences for other determinants of innovation, suchas tech-
nological opportunity or appropriability. There are candidates in the
literature, though none of them entirely remove the influence of fac-
tors other than changes in competition. Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright
(2004) examine firm-level performance following the privatization of
State-owned enterprises in 24 transition countries. They find evidence
of the importance of a minimum level of rivalry in both innovation and
output growth. Firms innovated more after the privatization event in
markets exposed to foreign competition. They also found evidence that
the presence of a few rivals was more conducive to innovative perfor-
mance than the presence of many competitors, suggesting an inverted-
U relationship between innovation and competition. Unfortunately, the
data in the study relating to both competition and performanceare self-
reported. Some firms were new private enterprises established after
privatization, while others were privatized existing firms, and some
remained as State-owned enterprises. These choices are likely endog-
enous to other market factors such as the perceived extent of competi-
tion, as are many other characteristics of the post-privatizationeconomy,
such as regulations that affect competition. Many of the firmswere very
small; one-half of the sampled firms had fewer than 50 employees. Fur-
thermore, State ownership entails many factors that influence invest-
ment in R&D in addition to a lack of market competition.
Using published accounts of about 700 U.K. manufacturing compa-
nies over the period 1972-1986, Nickell (1996) finds that an increase in
market share is associated with reduced levels of firm-level productivity
and that greater competition, as measured by the number of competi-
tors or the level of rents, is associated with higher rates of productivity
growth. Although the empirical approach in Nickell (1996) potentially
suffers from the confounding problem that high productivity can lead
to high market share, the fact that his results show a negative correla-
tion between productivity and market share makes this reverse causal-
ity issue somewhat less of a concern.
Changes in import policies, which cause relatively rapid changes in
market structure without changing technological opportunities,are
plausible albeit imperfect approximations for natural experiments.198 Gilbert
Significant increases in competition resulting from changes in import
penetration or other industry shocks have triggered the major restruc-
turing of some industries to achieve lower manufacturing costs and
to develop new and more competitive products.29MacDonald (1994)
confirmed these observations by analyzing the determinants of the rate
of growth of labor productivity (output per hour of labor) in 94 indus-
tries during the period 1972 through 1987. He found that increases in
import penetration had large positive impacts on labor productivity in
highly concentrated industries. Using labor productivity as an indica-
tor, albeit imperfect, of technical change, these results suggestthat a
sudden increase in competition had significant beneficial impacts for
technical progress in markets that had been highly concentrated. How-
ever, these are not true natural experimentsbecause imports respond
to many factors that are endogenous to innovation, and it isdifficult to
control for changes in technological opportunities over the time frame
of the study.
Aghion et al. (2004) use detailed micro-level data on UK firms from
1987-1993 along with patent counts and measures of foreign direct entry
to estimate the relationship between patenting and market competition.
Their study benefits from many policy changes and interventions that
changed the structure of UK industries over the sample period, such as
privatization events, changes in merger policies, and the introductionof
the European Union single-market program, at least some of which are
removed from, if not entirely exogenous to, the entry and innovation
decisions of the firms in the sample. They find that foreign direct entry
had very different effects on the innovation conduct of firms, depending
on the current performance of the industry inwhich they operate. They
defined current performance by the difference between the rates of pro-
ductivity growth of the industry relative to the comparable industry in
the U.S., as measured by a relative U.S./UK labor productivity index at
the four-digit (SIC) level. Firms in industries that were on par with pro-
ductivity growth in the U.S. tended to increase innovation in response
to entry while lagging industries did not and sometimesinnovated less
in response to foreign entry. They argue that technologically progres-
sive firms can "escape" the negative effects of entry by innovating. For
these firms, innovation can reduce their costs or increase theirproduct
value and make them more competitive against even efficient entrants.
According to their theory, lagging firms have little hope of improving
their competitive situation relative to efficient entrants, and they do not
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"step-by-step" theory of innovation in Aghion et al. (2002).The data
appear to provide some empirical support for the theory, although it
is not entirely clear why even lagging firms cannot catchup to or even
leapfrog the current best technology through their innovativeefforts.
Failure to Account for "Outliers."The objective of a statistical analy-
sis is to identify the main determinants that influence thevariables of
interest. Econometric models assume that thereare unobserved, latent
influences that are conveniently lumped into the "errorterm," but these
latent factors could be major determinants of innovativeoutcomes.
When we think of innovation, we think of individualsor companies
that are outliers in some sense. They exhibit flashes of brilliance,choose
a different path, and push the frontiers of technologicalprogress. We
must be careful not to suppress the role of the true innovatorsby bury-
ing them in the econometric error term.
Early studies, such as Jewkes et al. (1969) and Schmookler(1966)
emphasized the role of the individualas the source of innovation. Some
of the most commercially important discoveries havecome from inde-
pendent inventors with little or no contact with the industry thatthey
have revolutionized, and hence whose influenceson technology would
be very difficult to capture witha regression on market structure.
Chester F. Carison, the inventor of xerography,was a patent lawyer.
Gillette, the inventor of the safetyrazor, was a traveling salesman. J. B.
Dunlop was a veterinary surgeon when he invented thepneumatic tire.
An undertaker invented the automatic telephone dialingsystem, and
the inventor of the ballpoint penwas a sometimes sculptor, painter and
journalist. Even with the growth in corporate patenting and theimpor-
tance of scale to the development and exploitation of innovations,we
should not ignore that discoveriescome from creative people.
Outliers come in many varieties. The story of innovationsin dish-
washer technology is consistent witha vital role played by foreign
manufacturers, who designed dishwashers forconsumers facing con-
straints that differed from the typical installation inan American home.
While these models may have been initially ill suited forthe American
consumer, they had features, such as quiet operation, that American
consumers valued and that stimulated innovation by U.S. suppliers.
The history of innovation in the U.S. automobile industryshares a com-
mon thread.
Notwithstanding the generally negative findings from thesecond
wave of empirical research on the Schumpeterian hypothesis, thereremains a lingering view that innovative outputis related to market
competition. Based on an international study ofthe sources of competi-
five advantage, Michael Porter concludedthat "[R]ivalry has a direct
role in stimulating improvement and innovation..."30He concluded that
"A group of domestic rivals draws attention tothe industry, encourag-
ing investments by individuals, suppliers,and institutions that improve
the national environment, and creates diversityand incentives to speed
the rate of innovation..."31 Porter's thesis isthat firm structure and
rivalry interact with the supply of industryfactors of production and
demand in complex ways that are conducive totechnological progress.
The presence of these interdependencies likelycontributes to the diffi-
culty of uncovering clear conclusions fromstatistical studies of the rela-
tionship between market structure and R&D. At the sametime, Porter's
analysis is essentially a cross-section statisticalstudy, and suffers from
many of the data andmodeling problems that affect the other studies
listed in tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Industry-Specific Studies
Given the importance of technological opportunityand industry-
specific factors in R&D, some of the mostinsightful empirical studies
of the interaction between competition andinnovation focus on the
response of a single industry or even asingle research program, to
changes in market events. These studies do not meetthe test of a natu-
ral experiment in which all other factors thatcould affect innovation
are held constant, but they at leastavoid some of the problems encoun-
tered in cross-sectional studies. I discuss a fewsuch detailed studies
that focus on the dynamics of R&D.
In 1975, the Federal Trade Commissionreached a consent decree
with the Xerox Corporation that required Xerox tooffer nonexciusive
licenses at prescribed royalties for all of its patentsrelating to plain
paper copiers (more than 5,000 intotal). The FTC order generated a dis-
crete change in the structure of the plain papercopier industry. There
was a sudden entry of newcompetitors who previously were foreclosed
from competing in this industry because theydid not have access to the
Xerox patent portfolio. Bresnahan (1985)reported on the consequences
of the FTC consent decree. Xerox's share ofall plain paper copiers in
use fell from 100 percentin the early 1970s to about 45 percent by the
mid 1980s. There was a great deal of innovative activity overthis time
period by both Xerox and new entrants into theplain paper copier
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industry. Changes in technological opportunities in the post-consent
decree time period, such as the invention of the microprocessor, make
it difficult to draw a confident conclusion that the surge in innovation
was a direct result of the increase in competition brought about by the
consent decree. Instead, Bresnahan focuses on the direction of innova-
tion in the post-consent decree period. Generally, Bresnahan found that
firms entered market niches that were not close substitutes for their
existing product lines. For example, producers of coatedpaper copi-
ers (such as SCM, A.B. Dick and Royal) moved into high-speed plain
paper copiers, even though they possessed marketing and distribution
expertise that would have been particularly useful in the small-volume
copier segment. Many of the new entrants into the low-volume copier
segment were firms that had no prior experience in the copying indus-
try (such as Savin and Ricoh). Xerox continued to offer products for all
market segments.
Bresnahan (1985) concluded that "...firms that had a choice chose
to enter product segments where higher rates of inventive activity
would destroy others' rents, not their own." This is consistent with
innovation incentives that follow from the Arrow replacement effect.
Established firms have less incentive to innovate in theirown product
lines, because innovation erodes their current profit flows. However,
it is difficult to conclude that the experience in the post-1975 copier
industry is flatly inconsistent with preemption incentives. Plainpaper
copiers were a drastic innovation relative to existing technologies such
as coated paper copiers and photo-duplication. Plain paper copiers put
these other technologies out of business. We have seen that established
firms do not have differential incentives to preempt competitors when
inventions are drastic, because the new technology will bring their
existing profits to an end regardless of who invents. At best wecan con-
clude that the experience in the post-consent decree plain paper copier
industry is not inconsistent with Arrow's model of innovation incen-
tives for established firms.
Cockburn and Henderson (1995) examine R&D expenditures by phar-
maceutical firms at the therapeutic program level, in thiscase drugs in
the class of ACE inhibitors used to treat hypertension. Their dataset
is useful to test models such as Reinganum's (1985) patentrace, or the
preemption models in Fudenberg et al. (1983) and others. The authors
have detailed data on R&D expenditures for products that enjoy rela-
tively strong patent protection. The firmsare investing to patent new
ethical drugs, one of the few classes of products for which patentsare202 Gilbert
a primary means to appropriate value.Their conclusions provide valu-
able insights for studies of dynamic investment behavior. First they
note that firms do not appear to adjust the intensityof their research
programs in response to changes in R&D bytheir competitors. This
is an important result, because the ability to monitor rivals'research
progress is crucial to some models of preemptiveR&D, such as those in
Fudenberg et al. (1983). If the data revealed firms' reactions to changes
in rival investments, one would expect an increase in R&D at the pro-
gram level by one firm to induce responses(either higher or lower)
by rival firms. Cockburn and Henderson do not observe this behav-
ior. However, as they explain, this could merely reflect thatobserved
R&D programs are equilibrium responses to market conditions.They
observe equilibrium R&D intensities, not R&D levels along a reaction
function. When changes in equilibrium R&D intensities occur, these are
responses to market shocks that affect all competitors.
A second interesting finding in their analysis is that even in thesearch
for ethical drugs, where patent protection is key to commercial success,
the competition is not "winner take all." A discovery by one firm in a
therapeutic category does not cause rival firms to abandontheir R&D
programs in the same category. Indeed, severalof their empirical speci-
fications find the opposite. Discoveries by one firm tend to increase R&D
spending by rival firms. They explain this by noting that discovery is
often cumulative and does not foreclose new products by other firms.
For example, they observe that nine different pharmaceutical firms pat-
ented ACE-inhibitor drugs in the eight years after Squibb patented the
first drug in this category in 1977. There was, however, still a significant
early-mover effect; in 1990 the first two innovators (Squibb and Merck)
accounted for 90 percent of U.S. sales of ACE-inhibitors.
Cockburn and Henderson's analysis suggests that drug research has
large positive spillovers. Discoveries (in the form of patents) by one
company tend to expand the technologicalopportunities of other firms
and stimulate R&D spending. Although most of the theoretical patent
race literature assumes that a discoveryby one firm spells doom for
the profits and R&D programs of rival firms, Cockburn and Henderson
instead find that for ethical drugs in this category, research had sub-
stantial positive spilovers and drug discoveries by one firm did not
foreclose additional discoveries by other firms in the same therapeutic
category.
Lerner (1997) focuses on technology races in the market for computer
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current industry leaders are more or less likely than other firms to
develop improved disk drive technologies. The R&D racing literature
typically assumes that the reward to the winner of the race is a valuable
patent that excluded competitors, and patents were not important as an
appropriation mechanism in the disk drive industry during the period
studied by Lerner (1971-1988). Nonetheless, the market hadsome of the
qualitative features of a "winner-take-all" competition. Leading-edge
disk drives commanded much higher mark-ups than did lower perfor-
mance drives. Many firms exited the industry and some of the survi-
vors earned substantial profits, although perhaps for reasons other than
pure technological prowess. Although the innovation competition that
Lerner studied in the disk drive industry is clearly muchmore complex
than a simple winner-take-all market, it has some similarities, perhaps
more so than the market for ACE-inhibitors in which some follow-on
innovators were highly profitable.
Lerner used storage density as a proxy for the state of a firm's disk
drive technology and measured innovation in three different ways. For
each firm in the industry over the sample period, Lerner measured:
whether the firm introduced drives with higher density than it had
shipped earlier; the extent of the improvement in density; and the time
between shipment of drives with improved density. According to all of
these measures, the greatest amount of innovation occurred for firms
whose best drives in any year had densities within 25 and 74 percent of
the best drive in the industry. The firm that was the market leader was
less likely to introduce a better drive, made smaller improvements if it
did introduce a better drive, and took longer to introduce a better drive
than did firms whose technologies lagged the market leader.
Lerner argues that these results contradict claims that a leading firm
has an incentive to preempt rivals by investing more to improve its
technology. That does not necessarily follow. The costs and benefits of
technological improvements depend on a firm's location on the tech-
nological frontier. It should be easier for a firm to add another rung on
the technological ladder if it is half way to the top than if it is already
at the top. Furthermore, a firm that is far enough ahead might be able
to sustain its lead for some time without investing as much as its tech-
nologically less advantaged competitors. Lerner also found that the
number of competitors did not affect the rate of technological improve-
ment for leaders or followers. This is not surprising given the large
number of firms that supplied disk drives over this period. He did find
that firms with greater sales and those specializing in disk driveswere204 Gilbert
more likely to innovate, however it is difficult todisassociate firm size
from past R&D success. Lerner does not analyze whether the firm that
is the technological leader in disk drives at date t is more likely than
other firms to be the leader at date t + r. This question is more closely
related to the preemption hypothesis, but it is difficult to test because
one would expect a high degree ofautocorrelation in firms' technologi-
cal positions.
The observed pattern of competition that has occurred in the disk
drive industry is consistent with a stochastic technology race, whether
or not leading firms have some preemption incentive.Lerner's data
show that over the sample period, each firm that supplied disk drives
faced an average of about 25 other drive manufacturers. If each firm
invested the same amount in R&D and had identical technological
capabilities, the probabifity that any one firm would emerge as the
technological leader or maintain its technological edge is only about
four percent. If leading firms had an incentive to preempt their rivals
due to the efficiency effect from nondrastic innovation, the probability
that leaders would emerge victorious is still rather small even if they
invested at a much greater rate than any one of their competitors.
IV.Concluding Remarks
Although it is difficult to reach robust conclusions about R&D incentives
in different market structures, the theory permits some broad character-
izations. The incentives to invest in R&D increase with the profits that
a firm can earn or protect by innovatingand decrease with the profits
that a firm can earn if it does not innovate. For process innovations
that lower marginal production costs, innovation incentives are lower
for a monopoly that is protected from both product and R&D competi-
tion than for a competitive firm, provided that the innovator maintains
exclusive rights to the innovation. Allowing for competition in R&D
can reverse this result. With nonexclusiveintellectual property rights,
competition can lower incentives to invest in process R&D by reducing
each firm's output and hence its return from lower costs. Incentives are
more complex for new products, because profitsdepend on a firm's
product portfolio and even competitive firms are likely to earn profits if
they supply differentiated products. Nonetheless, the results for prod-
uct innovations parallel the results for process innovations if the new
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Under some conditions a firm has an incentive to preempt rivals by
investing more in R&D than the rivals can earn from the innovation.
Preemption may occur if a firm has a monopoly profit that itcan pro-
tect by acquiring an exclusive intellectual property right, or if the firm
is ahead in a patent race and can monitor the R&D activities of rivals
and invest to maintain its lead. Case studies of dynamic R&Dcompeti-
tion do not identify preemptive R&D expenditures by incumbent firms,
although it is difficult to draw this conclusion with confidence because
successful preemption eliminates rivals and leaves few traces.
With nonexciusive intellectual property rights, competitioncan
decrease the market available to each firm and lower the return from
innovation. In addition, competition can result in redundant expendi-
tures. Costs would be reduced if a single firm invested in R&D that
others could share. However, competition also canreverse these results
by increasing the risk that a manager may under-perform in R&D and
lose his job because his firm is not efficient enough to survive in the
marketplace.
The empirical literature is generally consistent with the conclusion
that R&D expenditures increase in proportion to business unit size
above some threshold value that varies across industries. For smallpro-
cess innovations, this is precisely what the theory predicts. The return
from investment is proportion to output at the business unit level. The
finding that R&D intensity is generally constant abovea threshold level
is generally interpreted as providing no support for structural policy
intervention to increase R&D. If the ratio of R&D to sales is constant
across business unit sizes, neither merger nor divestiture would increase
R&D spending, assuming no change in overall output. However,even
if all firms have the same R&D intensity, a fragmented industry would
have lower R&D incentives per firm and could result in redundant and
wasteful R&D expenditures. These inefficiencies might be avoided by
consolidating the business units, or by merging the R&D activities of
the separate business units in an R&D joint venture.
The empirical literature does not supporta conclusion that large
firms promote innovation because they provide large and stable cash
flows, economies of scale (above some threshold), or risk diversifica-
tion. This is contrary to Schumpeter's argument that monopolycan
promote innovation by providing a "more stable platform" for R&D.
At the same time, neither theory nor empirical evidence supportsa
strong conclusion that competition is uniformly a stimulus to innova-206 Gilbert
tion. There is little evidence that there is an optimal degreeof competi-
tion to promote R&D. Empirical studies that use marketconcentration
as a proxy for competition fail toreach a robust conclusion about the
relationship between market concentration and R&D when differences
in industry characteristics, technological opportunities,and appropri-
ability are taken into account. There is some evidence that competition
promotes innovation when the measure of competition is anindex of
proximity of firms to a technological frontier, rather than a simple mea-
sure of market concentration.
We remain far from a general theory of innovationcompetition,
although the large body of theoretical and empirical studies is begin-
ning to yield conclusions, however meager. Cross-industrystudies of
market structure and R&D are providing sharper insights by using
better data, being more careful about measures of competition,and
employing econometric techniques that better control for theequilib-
rium relationship between market structure and innovationand other
confounding factors. New learning is also emerging from individual
case studies that isolate specificindustry factors and technological
opportunities. In time we will find Mr. Schumpeter's proper place in
the debate over the relationship between competition and R&D.
Endnotes
These data are from press releases, annual reports, and complaints filed bythe U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
This risk could be avoided by requiring the licensee to pay for the know-howin
advance. However, such a requirement imposes a risk on the licensee, who has to payfor
the new technology before knowing what it is worth.
This is not a necessary result because competition lowers prices and increasestotal
output. The increase in total output can offset the reduction inthe output of each firm.
See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b) for a derivation of the effectsunder certain market
assumptions.
We show below that this conclusion can be reversed if inventors do notfollow the
rules of profit-maximization.
See Levin et al. (1985) and Cohen and Levin (1989) for surveys of howfirms value
patents and other mechanisms to appropriate the value of discoveries.
This result could change if the process innovation expanded the monopolist'sability to
price discriminate (see Baldwin and Scott (1987)). We assume that is notthe case.
Tirole (1997) provides an elegant demonstration of this result (p. 392).
The National Science Foundation estimated that in 1981, about 75 percent ofall indus-
try R&D was directed to product innovations (National ScienceFoundation 2004).Where Are We in the CompetitionInnovation Debate? 207
We avoid the question of whether the private incentives for product innovation
encourage firms to supply the set of products that maximize total economic surplus. It
is well known that even when firms choose among existing products, the interaction of
fixed product set-up costs and price competition may cause firms to supply too many
or too few products from the perspective of total economic welfare. See, e.g., Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977).
Boone (2000b) develops axiomatic conditions that characterize the degree of competi-
tion in an industry.
Increasing the number of competitors reduces the expected time to discovery; how-
ever the effects on each firm's R&D efforts depend on the particular formulation of fixed
and flow R&D expenses. Increasing the number of competitors increases R&D spending
per firm when R&D is a flow cost as in Lee and Wilde (1980). It has the opposite effect
when R&D is a fixed cost (see, e.g., Loury (1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a)).
Reinganum (1981) and (1982) describe patent races with similar discovery probabili-
ties and characterize some of the properties of the firms' optimal strategies.
Harris and Vickers (1985b) combine the payoff structure in the Gilbert and Newbery
(1981) model with a dynamic model of R&D competition in which the first firm to accu-
mulate a threshold stock of knowledge wins a patent. They show that the incumbent's
differentially larger incentive can deter rivals from entering the R&D competition.
Sutton (1998) emphasizes this point and explores its implications for equilibrium
market structures.
Although the number of firms n that actively compete in R&D is itself an equffi-
brium condition, we can vary this number by adding an additional sunk cost of entry,
which affects the number of firms that can satisfy the break-even condition given by
equation (1).
As in the case of discrete investment in R&D, the aggregate and per-firm R&D inten-
sities also decline with the number of active firms. In a model of Cournot-Nash competi-
tion with nonexclusive intellectual property rights, Farrell et al. (2004) find that the total
number of R&D projects in which the industry invests has an "inverted-U" shape, reach-
ing a maximum at an intermediate level of market concentration. R&D output falls with
the number of competitors, while total welfare peaks at intermediate levels of concentra-
tion due to price competition.
I use the terms competition and concentration interchangeably only for discussion. It
is well known that competition reflects market conduct, which need not be closely related
to measures of market concentration. Furthermore, as Boone (2000b) emphasizes, market
concentration is an equilibrium condition that is determined by characteristics of firms,
demand, and the R&D technology.
The dynamic model in Aghion et al. (2002) generates an inverted-U relationship
between R&D and market concentration, but the model assumes a rather special sequen-
tial structure for innovation.
Interview with Steve Jobs, Business Week, October 11, 2004,p. 96.
This assumes that managers are not indifferent between working for the firm and
taking another job. If they were indifferent, that would limit the ability of the owner to
induce additional effort.208 Gilbert
The total number of venture-capital financed startups in their database increased
from 221 in 1986 to 804 in 1999. The number of technology startups was 144 in 1986 and
232 in 1999, peaking at 372 in 1996.
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) attempt to do so in a series of papers that explore simple
models of bureaucracy.
See, e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) and Farrell et al. (2002).
24 Retained earnings are the source of funds for approximately 70 percent of all R&D
investment (National Science Foundation, 2004).
Carlton and Gertner (2002) and Katz and Shelanski (2004) reach similar conclusions
in the context of antitrust policy to promote innovation.
There is a large literature on the value of patents. See, e.g., Pakes and Griliches (1984),
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002), and Hall and Ziedonis (2001). Using data supplied by the
Small Business Association, Acs and Audretsch (1988) report a simple correlation of 0.467
between patents and innovations.
Brock (1975) observed that IBM originated only seven of 23 major early innovations
in computing.
See, e;g., Salinger's (1980) study of concentration and profits, which suggests that
both concentration and profits are likely related to innovation success.
See, e.g., Dertouzos et al. (1989) (describing the experience of Xerox, domestic steel
and chemical producers, and commercial airline manufacturers to increased competi-
tion).
Porter (1990), p. 143.
Id. at 144.
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Appendix. Example of a Market in Which the Incentive to Invest in
R&D Is Greater for Monopoly Than for a Competitive Firm
A total of N consumers are uniformly distributed along a line whose
length we normalize to one. Each consumer desires one unit of a good.
Firm A is located at the left end-point of the line. If a rival Firm B enters,
it locates at. the right end-point of the line. As this is only an exam-
ple, we simplify even further and assume that both firms have zero
marginal production costs. A consumer located at point x incurs a disu-
tility of tx if she buys from Firm A and incurs a disutility of t(1 - x) if
she buys from the rival. Either firm can sell a good that all consumers
value at v0 or invest in R&D and sell a good that all consumers value at
V1 > V0.
Suppose Firm A is a monopoly. If it sells a product with value VA at
price p. its share of the total market is x(p,vA)=min[(vA - p)/t,1] and its
profit is 21(vA)=max Npx(p, VA). If VA2t, the monopoly serves the entire
market and earns"
21(vA)=N(VA- t).
Now suppose the rival firm enters at the opposite end of the line. Let
PAand VA be the price and product choice for Firm A and PB and VB for
Firm B. Consumers located at x < t will purchase from Firm A and those
located at xwill purchase from Firm B, where
2t
provided that PA + P0 < VA + VB - t, so that all consumers make a pur-
chase. If each firm maximizes its profit by choosing a price assuming
that its price does not affect its rival's price (the Nash assumption), then
there is an equilibrium with PA=+ (VA - vB)/3 and P8=t + (VB - VA)!3,
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Assume v1 > v0 > 2t. The monopoly incentive to invent is
fl-rA(vl)2A(vO)_N'J'l-vO)
and is the same as the marginal social return from the innovation.




N[ 1 8(v1,v0)=I t+-(v1 _vo)]
2t[3
if it enters with the new technology. Monopoly yieldsa greater incen-
tive to invest in R&D than competition if
AO"1)2TA(''O)> 2rB(vl,vO)-2B(vO,vO),
or if v1 - v0 < 12t.
In this example, the incentive to invest in R&D is greater under
monopoly unless v1 - v0 is very large relative to t. Note that the social
value of technology v is W(v1) = N(v1- tL/2) and zlW= N(v1- v0)Alltm. The
monopolist earns the entire incremental social benefit from the innova-
tion. The return to innovation for a competitor is less for tworeasons.
First, competition between the competitor with the new product and
its rival with the old product limits the benefit from innovation. Sec-
ond, unlike the case of process innovation with constant marginalcosts,
the competitor earns a profit even if it does not innovate because
> 0 and this lowers its incremental return to innovation.